Legal Cases/Articles - Initiating Conversations Has Its Consequences
Initiating Conversations Has Its Consequences
By Jaime E. Suarez
In the landmark case, Miranda v. Arizona1, the United States Supreme Court stated that “the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.”2 According to Miranda, “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”3
Furthermore, in Edwards v. Arizona4, the United States Supreme Court found that where a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by police “until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”5
Oregon v. Bradshaw
The Edwards decision was further explained in the United States Supreme Court case, Oregon v. Bradshaw.6 In that case7, James Edward Bradshaw was arrested and his Miranda rights were read. At that time, Bradshaw informed the police officers that he wished to speak with a lawyer. The officers immediately terminated the conversation.
On the way to the county jail, Bradshaw inquired of one of the officers, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” The officer responded, “You do not have to talk to me. You have requested an attorney and I don't want you talking to me unless you so desire because anything you say-because-since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will.” Bradshaw said he understood. As a result of the conversation that ensued, Bradshaw agreed to take a polygraph and later confessed. The Court concluded:
There can be no doubt in this case that in asking, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”, respondent “initiated” further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word. While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word “initiate” in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to “initiate” any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally “initiate” a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards.
Although ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. It could reasonably have been interpreted by the officers as relating generally to the investigation. That the police officer so understood it is apparent from the fact that he immediately reminded the accused that “[y]ou do not have to talk to me,” and only after the accused told him that he “understood” did they have a generalized investigation. On these facts we believe that there was no violation of the Edwards rule8.
The United States Supreme Court then recognized that the state trial court “found that the police made no threats, promises or inducements to talk, that [Bradshaw] was properly advised of his rights and understood them and that within a short time after requesting an attorney he changed his mind without any impropriety on the part of the police.”9 The Supreme Court then agreed with the trial court that Bradshaw’s statements were voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent.10
Florida Cases
Francis v. State
The Florida Supreme Court addressed a similar situation Francis v. State.11 In that case12 Carlton Francis was arrested and transported to the police department where he received proper Miranda warnings. Although Francis refused to sign the rights waiver card, he agreed to speak to the officers. After speaking with the detectives for a very short time, Francis invoked his right to counsel. The interrogation immediately ceased, and the police left the room. This questioning lasted for approximately ten to fifteen minutes.
Although the detectives had terminated all conversation with him, Francis remained in the interview room as the police completed further work on the case. Approximately three and one-half hours later, Francis summoned the officers with a knock on the door of the interview room. At that time, Francis told the detectives that he wanted to talk to the police officers again. The detectives informed Francis that because he had requested an attorney, they could not speak with him further. However, Francis stated that he wanted to talk to the detectives regarding the case and that he no longer wanted a lawyer. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the statements subsequently made by Francis, without counsel being present, were admissible.13
Ahedo v. State
In a similar case14, the Tampa police department placed Joseph Ahedo under arrest for carrying a concealed firearm. About thirty minutes after his arrest, a police officer administered Miranda warnings to Ahedo. Ahedo indicated that he understood his Miranda rights, and invoked his right to remain silent and stated that he wanted to speak to a lawyer first. After Ahedo invoked his rights, the police officers did not attempt to further question him, except for questions such as his name, height, and weight.
Another police officer placed Ahedo in a holding cell while the officers completed their paperwork and prepared to transport him to the jail. About an hour and a half to two hours after his arrest, Ahedo told the police officer that he wanted to speak to the original police officer who had administered Ahedo his Miranda warning.
In light of the fact that Ahedo had wanted to speak to him "about what was going on," the original police officer met with Ahedo.15 Ahedo indicated that he wanted to speak with him regarding the charges. Ahedo was not re-read his Miranda warning.16 Ahedo then gave his statement, admitting to the crime. During this time Ahedo never asked for an attorney.17
On appeal, Ahedo argued that his request to speak with the original police officer about "what was going on" was not an invitation for conversation about the investigation and, even if it were, that the State failed to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of Ahedo's previously asserted rights. In its decision, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal stated that Ahedo's request to speak with the officer who had originally advised Ahedo of his rights supported the notion that he was fully aware of his rights.18
Conclusion
Individuals have the right to have counsel present during interrogation – this serves as a protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege. However, this does not happen automatically. An individual must state that he wants an attorney. According to the United States Supreme Court, any interrogation must then cease until an attorney is present. Interrogations without an attorney may commence however when an individual initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct., at 1625.
3 Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct., at 1628 (emphasis added).
4 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
5 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485.
6 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
7 The outline of facts is taken from Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1041-1042 (1983).
8 Id. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 1046.
10 Id. (citation omitted).
11 See Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110 (Fla.2001).
12 The outline of facts is taken from Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110 (Fla.2001).
13 See Francis, supra, 808 So.2d at 125-128.
14 See Ahedo v. State, 842 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The outline of facts is taken from Ahedo v. State, 842 So.2d at 869-870.
15 See Ahedo v. State, supra, 842 So.2d at 870.
16 See Id.
17 See Id.
18 See Ahedo v. State, supra, 842 So.2d at 871.
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